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AGENDA 
 
1. Why are we talking about power reform (again)? 
  
2. What is NZ Power? 
What changes to New Zealand’s electricity sector 
structure have the Labour and Greens proposed? 
 
3. Is it mainstream?  
 Which jurisdictions use an electricity sector structure 
 similar to the NZ Power proposal? 
 
4. Is it mad?  
 What does the evidence tell us about whether NZ Power 
 would lower electricity prices? 
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Why are we talking about electricity sector reform (again)? 
Source:  “The Economics of Electricity” June 2013, Electricity Authority 
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Overview of current market structure 
Vertical integration to form “gentailers” 
Develop new 
generation 
Dispatch existing 
generation 
Sell to end 
consumers 
Others Others 
Proposed sector structure with NZ Power 
Develop new 
generation 
Dispatch existing 
generation 
Sell to end 
consumers 
Others Others 
Long term contracts set to reflect costs of 
individual generation assets 
What have Labour and the Greens proposed? 
From Labour’s Policy Document: 
“A new agency called NZ Power 
will act as a single buyer of 
wholesale electricity… 
 
NZ Power will plan for new 
generation and invite offers to 
build new plants…this approach is 
common-place overseas” 
 
John Key’s Response: 
“[the proposal is] barking mad… 
 
…Really, these people are taking 
us back to something we 
abandoned in the 1970s because 
people used to sit around 
candles when all the lights went 
out.“ 
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Jurisdictions that Labour/Greens Claim are “Single Buyer” 
Jurisdictions that are clearly not “Single Buyers” 
Philippines 
Virginia,  
USA 
Europe 
(Italy) 
Jurisdictions with vertically integrated utilities 
South Africa 
Indonesia 
Two jurisdictions that are similar to NZ Power proposal 
Ontario 
Brazil 
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How might NZ Power lead to lower prices? 
• Make better decisions on new investments 
 
• Lower the costs of operating existing assets 
 
• Reduce the returns earned by generators: 
 
• Eliminating “excess profits” 
 
• Redistributing normal profits 
Are the costs of new generation likely to fall?  
Incentives Information 
Capability 
Characteristics of a good decision maker 
Are decision makers at NZ Power likely to make 
better decisions about where and when new 
generation is needed than private generators? 
Power planning: NZ Power unlikely to reduce cost 
 
Planned new 
generation plants 
(Statement of 
Opportunities 
2005 & 2008) 
KEY 
Geothermal  
Hydro 
Wind 
Gas 
Coal 
Power planning: NZ Power unlikely to reduce cost 
 
Minus planned 
plants, never built 
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Can’t Change O&M Costs of Existing System 
Generation 
(competitive) 
36% of residential 
electricity bill 
Transmission 
(monopoly) 
8% of residential 
electricity bill 
 
Distribution 
(monopoly) 
29% of residential 
electricity bill 
Retail 
(competitive) 
14% of residential 
electricity bill 
*Remaining percentage of retail costs: 2% on metering, 11% on tax 
 
Source: “Electricity in New Zealand” by the Electricity Authority 
How Might NZ Power Lead to Lower Prices? 
• Make better decisions on new investments 
 
• Lower the costs of operating existing assets 
 
• Reduce the returns earned by generators: 
 
• Eliminating “excess profits” 
 
• Redistributing normal profits 
O&M Costs are fixed: how else can we lower prices? 
 
O&M costs 
Normal 
returns 
Prices 
Super-
normal 
returns Cost based 
price 
Response: prices are consistent with entry costs 
Source:  “The Economics of Electricity” June 2013, Electricity Authority 
 
“[Wholesale] market power… is only a concern if it occurs frequently enough and to a 
significant enough magnitude to lead to average annual wholesale prices being above 
the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) of generation (AEMC, 2013) 
24 
Response: returns are consistent with cost of capital 
25 
No evidence that generator/retailers have been earning substantially more 
than a risk adjusted return on investment (the cost of capital) 
 
“Infratil Update” 
(http://www.infratil.com/assets/Uploads/PDF/updateseptember2013.pdf)   
• Return on Cobb Power Station (purchased in 2003) of 6% real  
(8% nominal) 
• Contact shareholder returns of 8.8% since 1999 
• Trustpower shareholder returns of 13.2% since 1999 
 
SOE generator/ retailer returns on historic cost (based on Ernst & Report to 
COMU) also in line with estimated cost of capital (see appendix) 
 
How Might NZ Power Lead to Lower Prices? 
• Make better decisions on new investments 
 
• Lower the costs of operating existing assets 
 
• Reduce the returns earned by generators: 
 
• Eliminating “excess profits” 
 
• Redistributing normal profits 
Can only lower prices by redistributing normal returns 
 
O&M costs 
Normal 
returns 
Prices 
Can be 
transferred 
from generators 
to consumers 
Lower Return on Investment Needed to Lower Prices 
 
Which investors will 
face a lower return? 
Privately 
owned 
generators 
State-
owned 
generators 
Regulatory expropriation “Money-go-round” 
Brazil: Politicians Lower Prices through Money-go-round 
 
EXPROPRIATION 
 
“The bottom line: shares in Brazil’s 
Eletrobras have fallen 50 percent 
in the past year because of a 
government drive to cut the cost 
of power” 
 
 
MONEY-GO-AROUND 
 
“Two companies… have decided not 
to renew their concessions – which 
give them a right to operate 
government-owned power plants 
and transmission lines – rather than 
accept rate cuts” 
Source: http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-07/brazils-cheaper-electricity-comes-at-a-cost  
Ontario's attempt to lower prices without lowering costs 
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APPENDIX 
 
Further material on analysis of returns of SOE 
generator / retailer returns against cost of financing 
assets valued at historic cost 
Concern: gentailer returns are too high 
Meridian Energy – Asset Values on Historic Cost and After Revaluations 
Source:  “ Asset revaluations, price gouging, and barriers to entry: the state of play in 
electricity sector non-regulation ” May 2013, Geoff Bertram 
 
$2,621m 
Capital based on historic cost from Ernst & Young “SOE Economic 
Profit Analysis”, 2011 
• Remove asset 
revaluations 
• Minus 
depreciation 
• Plus new 
investment 
34 
Response: returns are in line with historic cost 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Historic Cost of 
Assets (Capital) 
1,902  2,407  2,835  2,774  2,953  2,137  2,189  2,240  2,549  2,621  
Adjusted 
Profit* (NOPAT) 
103 171 224 305 257 271 228 195 329 291 
Return on 
Historic Cost 
5.4% 7.1% 7.9% 11.0% 8.7% 12.7% 10.4% 8.7% 12.9% 11.1% 
Cost of 
Capital** 
9.1% 9.1% 8.1% 8.8% 8.4% 8.5% 9.1% 9.1% 8.8% 8.6% 
“Excess” Return -3.7% -2.0% -0.2% 2.2% 0.3% 4.2% 1.3% -0.4% 4.1% 2.5% 
Notes: * Profits adjusted to reflect lower depreciation 
  ** Cost of capital estimates use 10 year bonds for the risk free rate, and an asset beta of 0.58 
Over the 10 years analysed by Ernst & Young, Meridian earned $221 million  
(+0.8 percentage points) more than the cost of capital (+$22.1 million per year) 
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Response: returns are in line with historic cost 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Avg. 
Meridian 
“Excess” 
Return 
-3.7% -2.0% -0.2% 2.2% 0.3% 4.2% 1.3% -0.4% 4.1% 2.5% 0.8% 
MRP 
“Excess” 
Return 
-2.3% 2.9% 5.3% 7.9% 6.8% 2.3% -1.6% 18.4% 2.4% -0.4% 4.2% 
Genesis 
“Excess 
Return 
-3.9% -1.1% -1.0% 0.4% 1.9% -1.0% -0.5% -5.0% 1.0% -1.8% -1.1% 
Over the 10 years analysed by Ernst & Young, all three SOEs earned $538 million 
(+1.1 percentage points) more than the cost of capital (+$53.8 million per year).  
 c.f. Bertram claims that generator retailers are earning excess revenues of 
 $1.5 billion per year (+$1 billion after tax per year) 
Notes: * Profits adjusted to reflect lower depreciation and higher tax (generally higher than reported profits) 
  ** Cost of capital estimates use 10 year bonds for the risk free rate, and an asset beta of 0.58 
36 
Difficulties Assessing the Competitive Returns Critique 
37 
• “Historic costs” are not observable – Bertram uses “vesting cost”, which 
may include previous asset write downs or upward revaluations 
 
• Ernst & Young use a consistent approach to backing out revaluation gains 
and adjusting for value changes in financial instruments and foreign 
exchange gains or losses 
• But hard to develop an approach that works for all companies in all 
years 
 
• Need to reconcile firm’s reported asset and net profit numbers – higher 
asset values will tend to reduce reported profits due to higher 
depreciation costs 
 
